The Cultivation and Propagation of Aesthetic Experience after its Declaration of Independence by Raffnsøe, Sverre
  
 
Porcelænshaven 18B 
DK-2000 Frederiksberg 
 
T: +45 3815 3636 
E: mpp@cbs.dk 
 
cbs.dk/mpp 
facebook.com/mpp.cbs 
twitter.com/MPPcbsdk 
 
  
M
P
P
 W
O
R
K
I
N
G
 P
A
P
E
R
 
THE AESTHETIC TURN 
The Cultivation and Propagation of Aesthetic 
Experience after its Declaration of 
Independence 
 
Sverre Raffnsøe 
 
Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy  
Copenhagen Business School 
Working paper no [1] - 2019 
 
ISBN: 978-87-91839-39-9 
 
  
 
2 
 
 
The Aesthetic Turn 
The Cultivation and Propagation of Aesthetic Experience after its Declaration of Independence  
Sverre Raffnsøe 
 
Table of Contents 
I. The genie of aestheticism .......................................................................................................................... 3 
II. Aesthetic transitions .................................................................................................................................. 5 
III. The normative ‘poetic’ approach to aesthetics in Plato, Baumgarten and Boileau .............................. 6 
IV. The receptive and reflexive approach to idealist aesthetics ............................................................... 10 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) ........................................................................................................................ 11 
Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805 ....................................................................................................................... 17 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) ............................................................................................... 18 
The romantic age ......................................................................................................................................... 19 
VI. The sublime experience ............................................................................................................................. 22 
The decay of being and the trans-historical ................................................................................................ 22 
The sublime comes to the fore as an ongoing constitutive aspect of aesthetic experience ...................... 25 
V. The changed aesthetic experience of the contemporary age ................................................................. 27 
The aesthetic declaration of independence: Liberation and desubstantialization ..................................... 27 
The fictionality of the aesthetic: reconfiguration and revivification ........................................................... 28 
The relative autonomy of the aesthetic experience ................................................................................... 29 
 
 
Keywords:  
aesthetics, aesthetic autonomy, aesthetic experience, beauty, the sublime, romanticism, fiction, poetics, 
Plato, Baumgarten, Boileau, Kant, Schiller, Hegel, Schelling, Schlegel, Athenaeum, Chateaubriand, de 
Musset, Gautier, Poe, Baudelaire, Heidegger, Lyotard, Rancière 
3 
 
 
I. The genie of aestheticism  
A spirit has been conjured up and walks about in the Occident: the genie of aestheticism. In our day, a 
decisive, overarching and comprehensive, turn to the aesthetic is making itself felt, particularly markedly in 
the parts of the world affected by and looking to Western ways of life, but similarly to different extents across 
the globe. As a result of this long-standing and sustained aesthetic turn, aesthetic perception and 
aesthetically creative activity have become ubiquitously present and momentous. An ongoing and probably 
long-lasting aesthetization manifests itself and becomes a matter of vital importance across a number of 
traditionally well-established divides; and this testifies to the fact that the aesthetic has begun to assume a 
substantial and increasing role and exert a decisive influence upon a number of practices, and in a number 
of spheres, where it used to have an essentially subordinate role. 
The turn to the aesthetic and aesthetization is a broad and sweeping, all-extensive and all-influencing, 
contemporary shift, transversally affecting and decisively changing the game in and across a number of 
traditionally distinguished sectors or fields.  
While political theory establishes that political practice and theory at local, national and trans-national level 
have becomes increasingly aestheticized and conscious of the decisive importance of aesthetic dimensions 
(Kompridis 2014; Amin, Ash., Thrift,N.J., 2013; Panagia 2006; Ranciere 2005, 13; Edkins, Jenny.,Kear, Adrian,, 
2013), the aesthetic dimensions of governmental, managerial, organizational and entrepreneurial practice 
have increasingly come to the fore, both in theory and practice (Raffnsøe 2019, forthcoming; Hjorth & 
Steyaert 2004; Hjorth & Steyaert 2009; Thyssen 2011). Equally, the importance of the aesthetic is recognized 
as decisive in and for cultural theory, cultural institutions, governance and popular culture (Bennett 2013; 
Grossberg, Nelson, and Treichler 1992; Hart 1992, 277-294; Grossberg 2010) as well as in media and media 
theory and in urban planning, focusing on creative cities and the creation of affective atmospheres.  
Concomitantly, the importance of the aesthetic element in marketing and public relations, in modern work 
life, for value creation, and for the economy more generally is asserted in manifold ways (Slowinska 2014; 
Böhme 2003, 71-82; Florida 2002; Boltanski & Chiapello 2005; Lazzarato 2002). Economic and aesthetic 
processes of innovation, creativity and value creation become closely interlinked, interpenetrate and 
mutually re-inforce each other to such an extent that it is warranted to speak not only of aesthetic production 
and consumption but also of aesthetic capitalism (Murphy and Fuente 2014) and aesthetic economy (Kanth 
2015). 
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While aesthetic approaches to the mobilization and modulation of motivation and to the establishment and 
affection of processes of innovation abound in the workplace, aesthetic processes of self-fashioning and self-
management, self-improvement and self-expression proliferate everywhere. Accordingly, “a new aesthetic 
paradigm” characterized by the “aptitude of (such) processes of creation to auto-affirm themselves as 
existential nuclei” and by the privileged position of “the aesthetic power of feeling” within the present 
assemblages is falling into place (Guattari 1995: 106). In turn, the entrance and integration of subjects 
characterized by an affective apprehension of the world and an aestheticized relationship of the self to the 
self noticeably alters the meaning and role of politics as previously indicated.  
In general, social processes have transversally become so thoroughly affected by aesthetic effects and so 
thoroughly mobilized, modulated and mediated aesthetically that it warrants the claim of an increasingly 
thoroughly sustained “aesthetization of the social,” voiced by contemporary observers (Reckwitz 2011: 334). 
According to Peter Sloterdijk, aesthetization of the globe has reached a point where the world may seem to 
have become a total work of art, “a crystal palace” or a world exhibition, that feigns to be so spacious and 
commodious that is able to include everything within its sphere and that you may never have to or be able 
to leave it (Sloterdijk 2005: 265-76; Sloterdijk 2004: 344-50; Sloterdijk 2001). 
The appearance of the very vigorous and compelling, yet somewhat enigmatic and inscrutable genie of 
aestheticism also raises a number of pressing questions. What is this this spirit already acknowledged by the 
powers in power to be itself a power? What does its appearance indicate? How did it come about? How are 
we affected by it? How come that this genie keeps returning and appearing ubiquitously over and over again? 
How come that we are so fascinated by it and keeps returning to it? What does it signal and give us to 
understand? 
To face these and related questions, the following text seeks to address the spirit and spectre of aestheticism 
and further investigate the ongoing turn to the aesthetic. In this manner, it follows Marcellus’ exhortation to 
his learned friend Horatio in the opening scene of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, as they are both is beseeched 
by a still intriguing ghost that manifests in a haunting and enigmatic way: ”Thou art a scholar, speak to it, 
Horatio!“ (Act 1, Scene 1). 
As will hopefully become increasingly clear, however, interpellating and questioning the spectre of 
aestheticism differs radically from investigating a specific subject area as a self-contained object which can 
be taken up in isolation and examined from a distance (Raffnsøe 2013). Rather, following the ghost’s 
exhortation “to remember me” by lending “serious hearing to what I shall unfold” (Act 1, Scene 5), a request 
put forward by the ghost’s very insistence, may lead to discoveries seriously implicating the interlocutor, to 
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such a degree that it not only changes his past and present existence but also forces the interlocutor to 
undergo change, as Hamlet experiences in the ensuing play. Forcing the spectre to halt and account for itself, 
the inquirer may discover that he/she needs to begin giving a different account of her/himself, and that that 
the manners of and conditions for giving an account of oneself have already been altered. At the same time, 
the very examination and substantiation of the spirit and the spectre disclosing itself is what may prevent us 
from being haunted in unforeseen ways. 
II. Aesthetic transitions 
To speak to, question and make the present spectre of aestheticism speak, the present article faces and 
examines its genesis. In what follows, I will try to provide an overview of the crucial stages in the history of 
philosophic aesthetics in the Western societies. It is in and through this history that the spectre of aesteticism 
has come into existence; and insofar as this history is still with us today, it continues to conjure up the spirit.  
The main part of this article describes crucial changes as they have taken place since Plato and up till the 
present day, with an emphasis upon the decisive aesthetic turn in German idealism and the last 200 years. 
As classical poetics and the aesthetic output of the classical age make clear, a prescriptive approach to 
aesthetic sensibilities and expression was prevalent until the middle of the 18th century. Ideally, aesthetic 
works, experience and sensibility were supposed to live up to, represent and disseminate a generally binding 
normative foundation (Shusterman 2006, 2-3:237-38; Rancière 2009: 28-29). The beginnings of modern 
aesthetics in the latter half of the 18th century included receptive and reflective relationships to a liberated 
and irreducible aesthetic sphere. 
After a relatively short investigation of the classical normative approach to aesthetics in Plato, Boileau and 
Baumgarten that presents a contrast to subsequent development in part III, the article turns to the 
declaration of aesthetic independence as it is pronounced in German idealism. The development of an 
independent aesthetic level or sphere and the strengthening of its characteristics occurring from Kant, 
Schiller, and Hegel until the Romantic age and modern literature is developed in some detail in part IV “The 
receptive and reflexive approach to idealist aesthetics” and part V “The sublime experience.” 
The coming about of a special aesthetic level liberated from reflecting and reenacting a universal normative 
basis does not result in it becoming inconsequential, but rather that the aesthetic level gains in importance. 
The consequence of the liberation was that aesthetic effects may be employed in a multitude unanticipated 
ways. This is described in the final part VI “The changed aesthetic experience of the contemporary age.” 
However, the declaration of independence of the aesthetic also results in the aesthetic becoming an 
irreducible existential issue in a new sense. This is because we must increasingly (re)locate, transgress, and 
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restate ourselves without knowing ourselves in advance. In extension of this, the article will therefore 
conclude by posing the question: How does aesthetic experience function today? The article hereby sketches 
how the transformation of aesthetic experience has decisive implications for individuals and organizations 
when they employ aesthetic effects and speak to aesthetic experience. 
The aesthetic is no longer a lesser category that is put to use to represent or channel something more basic. 
It has itself become the general and overall medium that we are located and come about in. Aesthetics may 
still to some extent remain an applied art, but we have begun using the aesthetic in a new way, where it is 
no longer perceived as a means to a higher end over and above it. The precondition for how to make use of 
the aesthetic has changed, and this has far-reaching consequences not only for the aesthetic. 
III. The normative ‘poetic’ approach to aesthetics in Plato, 
Baumgarten and Boileau 
The contemporary meaning of aesthetics is connected to and developed from a very long historical trajectory 
that extends several hundred years. Initially it is possible to characterize this change as a change in the status 
of the aesthetic plane. There has been a development, over the course of several hundred years, which can 
be described as a release or liberation of the aesthetical plane, whereby it has been relived from its task of 
serving and mediating other deeper standards. Aesthetics must no longer express and live up to a universal 
normative foundation. This liberation of the aesthetical is indicated in the various attempts at conceptualizing 
aesthetic phenomena, perhaps most noticeably in the distinction between older poetics and younger 
aesthetics. 
Poetics took its outset in the idea of a given ‘true’ or ‘correct’ order and could from this appear as a lawgiver. 
It seeks to determine the rules or laws without which an activity cannot be said to have happened properly, 
wherefore it must live up to those very laws. In the poet Nicolas Boileau-Despréaux’s (1636-1711) Ars 
Poetique from 1674, there is still an attempt to formulate the rules, which the aesthetic must follow (Boileau 
2010). In this manner, he remains located in extension of a normative tradition of poetics, which reaches 
back to antiquity. Already Aristotle (384-322 BC) called his work on the Greek tragedy and comedy Poetika 
(Aristotle 1999, 26-141).  
By contrast, subsequent and more recent aesthetics was, however, a retrospective examination of a given 
area. It seeks to determine, which rules or logos applies to it. Whereas poetics was understood as normative 
and constitutive for its ‘object’, aesthetics is receptive and reflective. When Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten 
(1714-62) employs the concept of ‘aesthetics’ as the first, in describing an independent discipline 
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(Baumgarten 1750-58/1983), he hereby indicates the initial steps in a liberation of the aesthetic, which 
results in it taking the shape of a post hoc, retrospective reflection1  
With Baumgarten and over the next 300 years, aesthetics became an increasingly independent activity. All 
the while, aesthetics was secreted as an autonomous level (characterized by its own logic and subject to its 
own regularities) and not heteronomous (i.e. subject to an alien normativity).2 This change and its 
implications will be taken up in greater detail in this article by tracing the various intermediary, historical 
stages of the development. 
It was a characteristic of poetics that it related to the aesthetic by indicating a more comprehensive context. 
It took an outset in an accepted and basic normative truth and involved the idea of possessing knowledge 
about the nature of reality, where this truth had such a character that it gave reality as a whole order and 
direction. Understanding the truth hereby seemed to guide and commit our way of living. The normative 
truth retained the idea of another world however. Thus, truth not only involved commitment, but also 
generated space for the hope of another and better world than the one immediately inhabited, since this 
other world was conceived as having a relative surplus. Plato’s notion that our world had an inherent ideality, 
the theory of forms, was the idea of such a basic normative truth. 
For Plato, all being is ordered around a supernatural foundation which rests upon an inherent metaphysics. 
Being identifies the original presentation of something foundational, the presentation of a certain quiddity, 
that we must take for granted. For Plato all of reality can be understood as the presentation of such a 
                                                          
1 In accordance with this historic change, term ’poetics’ is still in use today, but has acquired a somewhat different 
meaning. ‘Poetics’ has come to refer to the study of linguistic techniques, procedures, and practices in poetry and 
literature, but now above all as a post hoc and not a prae hoc activity. It examines an already ongoing aesthetic creation 
to determine the processes and rules involved, but with a special reference to the very act of making poetry or writing 
literature in the future that will not necessarily have to follow the same, already established and given rules. In this 
sense one may speak of Yeats’ Poetry and Poetics (Sidnell 1996). Here poetics has attained the same status as aesthetics, 
namely a reflection that allows you to become affected, re-examine, develop and move on. 
2 The fact that aesthetics becomes independent is for instance seen in the framing of pictures (Schapiro 1973). The 
frame indicates a boundary between the image and the world, whereby the image attains its own laws that are separate 
from those of the surrounding world (Lebensztejn 1981). Conceived as an ontological marker, framing constituted an 
innovation with regard to the scenarios and figures that had been painted on church walls. Often these were not even 
framed and were not to be conceived as a separate realm to be distinguished from the real world (Gumbrecht 2007). In 
this medieval universe people would get together to tell each other heroic eposes or hagiographies as we know it from 
Beowolf (Mitchell et al. 1998) and La Chanson de Roland (Duggan, Joseph J. 2005), The Life of Saint Christopher (in 
Voragine 1260?) or The Life of Stefan Lazarevic by Constantine of Kostenets. These were stories about how great men 
or women were subject to trials of character and became inspirations to others in terms of strength, virtue or sanctity. 
Whether the events had actually taken place was less important for this exemplary character. The modern distinction 
between the real and the literary world had not yet become important. However, with the differentiation of the 
aesthetic, which was subsequently initiated, there occurs a movement from general exempla, or role models, to the 
manifestation of an independent pictorial matter expressing a specific sensorium and permitting to make specific 
aesthetic experiences. At the same time the distinction between fact and fiction likewise becomes important. 
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foundation; ideally it would involve an adequate representation of the original presentation. Plato’s concept 
of truth hereby becomes a form of correspondence truth (Heidegger 1930-31/1975). Truth is the adequate 
representation of a more primordial being (Heidegger 1930-31/1942/1978: 175-236, 176-78). 
 
Figure 1 
However, this results in a problem of representation or presentation, since not everything seems to be a 
complete or adequate representation of the original foundational being (Derrida 1972b, 69-198; cfr. Also 
Derrida 1972a 7-67: 22, 31, 61). There occur distortions and concealments when the original presentation is 
represented in our world. Accordingly, Plato urges utmost caution in the use of representation and rendering 
and at times subjects them to severe criticism. In Phaidrus (276a), Plato finds fault with writing since it is a 
simple “bastard” (Plato 1914: 567) and a mere “imperfect depiction (or epitome, eidolon)“ of a more 
legitimate brother, “the living and breathing word” or speech, which in turn remains an imperfect rendering 
of the idea. In The Republic, Plato voices a critique of rendering or representation, since it must be understood 
as mimesis: as an imitation or a mere re-rendering of the original representation. Here (395b-c), Socrates 
admonishes the guardians of the state that they should “practice nothing else unless it has relevance to the 
state” and underlines that “if they do imitate, then they must imitate those things which are appropriate 
from earliest childhood: brave, temperate men, pious, free, and all such things” (Plato 2013a 259). In this 
context, Socrates consequently stresses the need for caution against comedy and tragedy in so far as they 
may often seem to imitate less blameless courses of life or emotional attitudes (Plato 2013a 257-59). Towards 
the end of the Republic (595a), Socrates stresses that it is important “not to allow anything in which is in any 
way imitative” (Plato 2013b: 391). In particular, he here levels criticism at not only the tragic poets, but poets 
in general, at least insofar as they are likened to the painter who only creates a picture which is a mere 
representation or imitation of the bed that a craftsman has created and not a true presentation of the idea 
of the bed that the craftsman must take as his starting point if he is to make a proper bed (595-608; Plato 
2013b 390-441). Like the painter, the poet is prone to make a copy of a copy and is thus likely to lead us 
astray from what we ought to commit ourselves to.  
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Figure 2 
Nevertheless, distorted representations can be conceived relatively easily by philosophy, since it is able to 
conceive the various imperfect representations as partial revelations of the original foundation. Classical, 
antique philosophy thus employs a supplemental concept of correspondence truth. This is a concept of truth 
as unveilment or disclosure (Heidegger, Martin, Mörchen, Hermann,, 1988; Heidegger 1947, 5-52). The things 
of the world can thus be true in a more derived sense insofar as they involve a limited representation of the 
original foundation. Plato’s world is thus a hierarchical, coherent universe. Everything has the foundation as 
its telos or end goal – it strives towards it. And everything in the universe is ordered according to how 
adequately or appropriately its revelation of the foundation is. 
 
Figure 3 
In extension of this the term ‘the beautiful’ does not only concern specific aesthetic objects for Plato. It is a 
particular way, whereby a higher being or metaphysics appears or is presented in the common reality. In the 
beautiful representation something higher shines through in such a way that reality seems to indicate the 
higher being or truth. Since the being that mediates itself in its appearance is beautiful, Plato is therefore 
able, in Phaidros (250d), to characterize beauty as that which “is most clearly seen and loveliest” (Plato 1914: 
485).3 The beautiful is experienced as a mutual penetration of or ‘correspondence’ between the metaphysical 
                                                          
3 The expression “most clearly seen” translated in the Loeb edition seeks to render the Greek term “ta 
ekphainestaton,” which is a substantivized adjective in the superlative form originating in the middle voice of the 
Greek verb ‘phaino’, usually translated as ‘shining’ or ‘bringing forth into the light.’ Consequently, a more fitting 
translation would be ‘the most forth-shining’ or ‘that which presents itself most clearly or most manifestly’.” Hegel 
still uses the term in the wider metaphysical sense when he defines the beautiful as “das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee 
(the sensual shining forth or rendering of the idea)” in Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik (Hegel 1817-1829/1970a: 151). 
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and sense reality, which results in the indication of something ‘higher’. As long as the beautiful denotes the 
luminous nature of metaphysics or being, it will remain in a close relation to the good and the true. 
The entities we currently call, ‘aesthetic,’ ‘art,’ and even an ’individual’ can only be imagined in this kind of 
universe. They only exist within the given constraints of that universe. Humans, aesthetics, and art only attain 
a specific identity insofar as they are reflected in the more basic subject, namely the original basis of forms. 
This view of reality as being a comprehensive and connected foundation was the outset for philosophy for a 
very long time. What is given as the foundation of being changed over time, but philosophy long expected to 
find such a basis as that given in Plato’s theory of forms. Even during absolutism the idea was that society 
rested upon a foundational and divine cosmic order. Because the basic truth was universal, it also constituted 
a commitment to aesthetic aspects of being. In poetics this universal validity was given as universal validity 
of general rules to be followed by aesthetics. According to Nicolas Boileau’s Art Poetique, the maxims still 
applied, as is evident in his letters where he states: Nothing is beautiful but the true: the true alone is 
agreeable; It must reign everywhere, even in the fable: The well-turned falsity of all fiction serves only to 
make the truth more readily seen. 4 That truth was not immediately accessible to everybody was clear from 
the innumerable controversies about it. The normative truth was an emphatic truth. It transcended what was 
accessible to ordinary people, and therefore also came across as esoteric. And yet it was clear to the initiated 
that truth left an imprint on reality as a whole. 
In Aesthetica, Baumgarten still operated with such an overarching concept of being as a normative and 
hierarchical connection. However, he also begins to develop a sensitivity to the fact that aesthetics can 
contribute to the context with more than mere rational cognition of the whole to which it seems at first 
subordinated (Baumgarten 1750-58/1983; Shusterman 2006). At that time, however, faith in the obvious and 
universal subject had already been challenged for some time. Yet the consequence of this development does 
not appear more fully until the aesthetics of Immanuel Kant. 
IV. The receptive and reflexive approach to idealist aesthetics 
At Kant’s time, an inner gradual decomposition or disintegration of the comprehensive system of 
representations that had been dominant so far had taken effect for some time. The foundation, which the 
previous representational system build upon, does not last forever and calls for a new basis that does not 
                                                          
4 “Rien n’est beau que le vrai : le vrai seul est aimable; 
Il doit régner partout, et même dans la fable : 
De toute fiction l’adroite fausseté 
Ne tend qu’à faire aux yeux briller la vérité” (Boileau 1821: 111-12). 
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necessarily have a similar transmitted, intuitive and comprehensive appeal to us. But all the while there is a 
strengthening of another basis for human existence that was under way within and below the previous 
approaches. At this point, an existence where mankind creates his or her own basis for life has been in the 
making for quite some time. This basis is sought out in activities such as labour, science, technology, and has 
roots that go far back in time (Heidegger 1935/1980: 73-110), but which only come to dominate societal life 
at a relatively late stage (Raffnsøe 2016). These are all activities whereby humans move beyond their 
containment in and dependence upon an overarching nature and supernatural beings in order to attain 
mastery over life to such a degree that we become subject of our own life and existence (Heidegger 
1935/1980: 73-110). 
 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) 
When it is no longer possible to draw upon a given metaphysical basis or foundation, the previous order 
threatens to collapse and communication between various segments of society, which was assured through 
this state of affairs, risked collapsing. Kant’s philosophy may be viewed as an attempt to reflect upon the 
dissolution of the previously given metaphysical order and on man’s becoming the foundation of his own 
existence through this process. Kant’s work can be viewed as an attempt to instigate a new order on the basis 
of this transition, i.e. as laying the groundwork for a new order that emphasizes man as the basis (cfr. also 
Kant 1783/1978: 51-61). This philosophy confirms and considers the circumstance that man is becoming the 
subject of being. The humane has now become the centre of man’s own attention (Raffnsøe 2016).  
This historic watershed was initially reached and marked with Kant’s Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Kant 
1781/1976a-b). In his first Critique, Kant seeks to show how the world can appear as an ordered totality by 
taking an outset in the human subject, party by determining the limits for understanding reality on these 
terms. For Kant, the world appears as ordered in force of human categories and modes of perception (Kant 
1781/1976a: 67-307). 
Kant seeks to construct the basis for a novel order, which, is fundamentally different from the previous 
teleological-cosmological order. For this reason, it also attains a very different character: It is far more 
instable; also it is difficult to retain the notion of reality as a unified totality. 
The instability and fragility of the new edifice is first and foremost due to the fact that it is no longer erected 
on the basis of an infinite metaphysical subject, but rather on the basis of a limited and finite human subject, 
which is only able to represent reality to itself. As a consequence, the world appears ordered primarily in 
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force of human perceptions; and for Kant these are always successive. According to Kant, we organize our 
reality through a sequence of perceptions to be furthered ordered and cognized through rational categories. 
 
FIGURE 4 
An inversion occurs in regard to Plato. Where ordered reality happened through a pre-given metaphysical 
system in Plato’s perspective, reality is now the add-on, which we from this human outset are forced to work 
towards. The consequence of this is first and foremost that order can only be constituted through a 
continuous effort on behalf of the human subject. Furthermore, it means that total order can never be 
established or reached. Rather, order becomes a regulative principle for the human subject (Kant 
1781/1976a: 267-85). This subject is from now on concerned with the never ceasing task of creating an 
ordered reality, which is only ever partially complete. Finally, the human subject is only able to implement 
an ordering of reality in terms of how that reality appears to man. 
In this sense there appears baselessness, at least in comparison with the Platonic outset. When we, as limited 
subjects, determine reality, we always do so as it appears to us and are never able to attain reality in itself. 
The reality which is founded on the human subject and its representation appear in a wider perspective as 
limited and unfounded. It is given the character of a limited reality that appears in a void. 
This shows that the previous holistic metaphysic is not merely replaced by a different metaphysic with Kant. 
There is rather a loss of metaphysics: the previous totality contained a surplus, something more, for which 
there is no room in Kant’s view of reality. At the same time this surplus cannot just be rejected as empty talk 
and illusion. The new conception of man that appears also has a need to make a declaration about the 
complete and actual status of reality, such that its reality appears less unfounded. There is for Kant therefore 
“Naturanlage zur Metaphysik” (Kant 1781/1976a: 60), or natural inclination towards metaphysics in the new 
kind of man which is only able to conceive of reality in epistemological terms. 
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We can only talk about the character of such a super-natural reality when the outset is man. Luckily, however, 
this is still possible. Man is not only able to imagine such a different ordered reality behind reality, but also 
has a substantial idea about how such a reality must be. 
In order to give voice to this other kind of subjectivity, Kant publishes Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten 
in 1785 and Kritik der praktischen Vernunft in 1788. In these works, Kant articulates the subject’s inner idea 
or notion of how the world should and ought to be. 
 
FIGURE 5 
Nevertheless, this opens up a schism in Kant’s philosophy. The later works do allow a surplus in regard to 
reality as it is given according to a critique of pure reason, but becomes difficult to articulate the connection 
or the relationship between reality as it is established in the first critique and the world as it ought to be 
according to the second critique. On the one hand there is a super-natural reality, or some demands on how 
the world must be, or the world at it ought to be according to the human subject. On the other hand we find 
reality: the world as it actually is according to the subject. This means that the world, as it can be ordered 
with an outset in the human subject, is not an all-comprising totality as was the case with Plato. The new 
order is distributive (Nancy 1976); it is made up of separate parts with no substantial or solid connection to 
each other. This predicament once again implies that mankind finds itself in a powerless position. The human 
subject cannot help picturing the being of the world to itself in a different and more fundamental way and 
cannot let this conception or representation of the world go; but neither does the human subject find itself 
able to insinuate this hyperreality in the world and make it real. Consequently, the world - when it is based 
on the human subject – does not permit the subject to express its inner-most subjectivity.5 
                                                          
5 Kant’s introduction to the Kritik der Urteilskraft points out that “an immense gulf is fixed between the domain of the 
concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom,the supersensible,(eine unübersehbare Kluft 
zwischen dem Gebiete des Naturbegriffs als dem Sinnlichen und dem Gebiete des Freiheitsbegriffs als dem 
Übersinnlichem) so that no transition from the sensible to the supersensible (and hence by means of the theoretical use 
of reason) is possible, just as if they were two different worlds, the first of which cannot have any influence on the 
second (Kant 1790/1978: 83; Kant 1987: 14-15 (Einleitung)). 
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If Kant is to avoid this schism – which means that the world falls apart and that the foundation of man 
dwindles away – a third perspective is needed. This must show the possibility of uniting the two opposed 
positions. This third perspective is sought, equally with an outset in the human subject in Kritik der 
Urteilskraft (1790). 
In this third perspective, the subject withdraws from its surrounding world (reality and metaphysics). It 
orients itself towards its own inner workings and through this discovers some inner states conveying pleasure 
or delight. In this manner, he subject identifies a few moments of happiness in an otherwise indifferent world. 
These happy moments are connected with the experience of certain objects. This may be the perception of 
beautiful flowers (for instance tulips), birds (humming birds or birds of paradise), or sea shells (see Kant 
1790/1978: 146-49 Kant 1987: 76-78 (§ 16)). All these perceptions have an experience of a friendly or 
‘humane’ nature in common. This is a kind of nature which occurs in a peaceful garden. It does not threaten 
us, but rather seems to be at our disposal – to be there for us and our inner desires.  
For Kant it hereby suggests that these sensory perceptions appeal to us because we seem to be able to do 
with nature as we actually want to in our heart of hearts. The feeling of pleasure is caused by the impression 
that the objects of sensation seem to be freely at our disposal. Thus they do not seem to oppose or resist 
that we might realize our inner morality in and through our actions. What is perceived indicates that the 
moral imperative can gain a footing in perceived reality.  
In this way Kant sees what is sensed as a perception or as a limited representation of something higher, which 
is given in the inner subject and which the human subject can graft on or transplant to its own experiences. 
Perception is hereby given symbolic importance: It represents a comprehensive system of representation, 
which is otherwise not present. Perceived reality therefore momentarily appears as a reality that is subject 
to the laws of morality. These are happy or privileged moments, since man’s lost belonging to a complete 
teleology, which was previously a given but not anymore, seems restored for a short moment. Mankind is 
hereby granted participation in a cohesion which ascribes meaning and direction to being, since it orients 
towards a centre and a goal. A teleological-cosmological order re-appears for a short while. 
 
15 
 
 
FIGURE 6 
The world becomes beautiful for a moment, since it seems to be in correspondence with and reflect the 
metaphysical assumptions we truly desire. This is why the aesthetic experience pleases us. For a short 
moment everything confirms that man can be the subject of his world and install a comprehensive normative 
order on that basis. The teleological order is, however, only experienced for a short while, where after the 
individual returns to reality and the ruptured world. 
For sensation to carry the impress of pleasure and delight, it must occur in relative autonomy. It must be 
autonomous or liberated from external purpose. According to Immanuel Kant, cognition does not please us 
because perceptions are here always already subject to human purpose. In cognition, consequently, 
perception does not subject itself ‘freely’, but is forced, wherefore subjection becomes a given and a matter 
of course. Liberated from the usual external purposes, experience (even though it is not to be considered as 
a cognition) is able to ‘please us’ by offering itself up as being at our disposal. The perceived hereby indicates 
that nature naturally, unforced and unrestrained, off itself offers itself up to our purposes of itself; yet, at the 
same time, the perceived can only be interpreted as being at our disposal from these purposes. As a 
consequence, representation or perception is hereby liberated with hindsight or with a certain purpose: It is 
set free with the firm conviction that it will end up confirming a given metaphysical order. In spite of our 
inner metaphysic’s challenges in asserting itself and manifesting itself, the validity of inner practical reason 
remains unchallenged. Autonomy is therefore only to be conceived as relative; it is provisional and made to 
be dissolved. 
For Kant the good, the true, and the beautiful are hereby far more separated than was the case for Plato. 
The question about what is true is initially determined when we examine reality, such as it is represented 
and retained in communal cognition in reason. By contrast, the question of the good, which we ought to 
follow, is primarily determined through the insight attained when we, as sensible human beings, examine 
moral considerations and how they force themselves upon us in the form of categorical imperatives that we 
need to comply with (Kant 1788/1978: 59-80). The beautiful, however, appears or is concealed in the 
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aesthetic movement, which requires a suspension of both reason and moral intuition (Kant 1790/1978: 115-
131). 
In Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique of Judgment) Kant primarily takes up human aesthetic perception, while he 
relatively far on in the work (§44-53) considers objects we would currently view as art under the category 
“Deduction of aesthetic judgments”. This is done apparently in passing in a kind of appendix. Art thus still 
plays only a minor role as an additional confirmation of what Kant thought he has already shown in general 
in regard to the perception of external beautiful, natural objects. In the appendix, he shows that this 
demonstration can also be made for the particular kind of objects produced and shaped by humans, insofar 
as it is also possible to lay down a third perspective, which is able to bridge the gap between reality and 
morality.  
In art, I take an outset in my inner aesthetic subjectivity and produce objects that give me pleasure and 
delight. Here, the subject thus is able to (re-)stage the confirmation of the third perspective through a direct 
intervention in and transformation of reality. Thus, reality is re-produced or re-rendered as beautiful to such 
a degree that is appears as suitable for moral advancement. 
 
FIGURE 7 
In this sense, inner subjectivity appears as the guiding point for art. Here man actively and freely shapes and 
recreates reality, keeping the subject’s inner morality in mind, such that its sense perceptions confirm that 
human agency can be felt in the world. For Kant there is no great need for the additional confirmation of art. 
The more important issue is for the perception of free and beautiful nature to show that reality can confirm 
the subject without active human intervention. For Kant, the subject still - in general - possesses a self-
confidence that means it can mirror itself in external and wild nature and, through that, generate cohesion 
in its world. The contemplation of art still seems to permit yet another confirmation of a more general 
capability and state of affairs, but within a particular and limited realm. This realm has already been 
preconditioned for this re-affirmation insofar as it is established through the direct intervention of the human 
subject. Consequently, this final re-affirmation is tainted by a circularity. 
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Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) 
Nevertheless, it later becomes increasingly urgent for the human subject to directly address and 
systematically stage a third, unifying perspective in order to generate and maintain cohesion in the world. 
This active effort is apparently motivated by a sense of increasing incompatibility between reality and man’s 
inner, practical metaphysics. The events of the French Revolution probably emphasized this schism, since it 
was viewed as an attempt to let man’s inner subjectivity determine history. When this revolution failed, it 
became reasonable to interpret this outcome as proof that man’s inner morality and reality could not be 
united.  
As a consequence, art is given a far more central position in thought after Kant’s critical philosophy, since 
fine art is viewed as a means of actively staging a third perspective and thus uniting morality and reality. This 
development can be found in the theoretical writings of Schiller during the 1790s. In a number of letters 
addressed to his friend Christian Gottfried Körner towards the end of 1792 and early 1793, Schiller further 
scrutinized and sought to critically correct Kant’s aesthetics after his having become acquainted with Kritik 
der Urteilskraft in 1791 (Schiller 1792-93/1971: 139). Even though Schiller’s plans to rewrite and integrate 
the letters into a major work entitled Kallias oder Über die Schönheit was never realized, a selections of the 
letters have later been published under the same title (Schiller 1792-93/1971). Somewhat later, Schiller 
began publishing Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in his own journal Die Horen from 1795 and 
onwards, based on a number of letters written to his patron prince Friedrich Christian von Augustenborg in 
1793 (Schiller 1775-1801/2000). There appears the idea of an increasingly close relation between art and 
philosophy, setting them of from the rest of society. Art is given the task of positing a third unifying 
perspective on reality with the help of philosophy.  
The outset for the creation of art is, for Schiller, that we in the schism between morality and reality take the 
side of sensible morality (Schiller 1792-93/1971), but ‘improve’ existing reality through re-cultivation of being 
in art, which is not in itself directly moral (Schiller 1775-1801/2000). Since art, in classicism, recreates a reality 
that is in opposition to morality, it presents itself as a reality that requires moral intervention. Thus, if we 
cultivated all of reality completely and made all of life into art, reality would be primed for the introduction 
of our inner morality. However, philosophy ensures that the third unifying perspective is oriented towards 
inner practical human metaphysics.  
The experience of an exclusive proximity between philosophy and art, which distinguishes these two from 
other areas of being, therefore also constitutes a distribution of labour. By imagining a division of labour and 
collaboration between art and philosophy, art also becomes an autonomous entity with its own logic and 
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potential for something unique, which cannot be granted by any other area of being. At the same time 
philosophical aesthetics is founded as a discipline that takes up the concern for art. Indeed, for quite some 
time it becomes the core philosophical discipline. In his Vorschule der Ästhetik, 1804 Jean Paul (Johan Paul 
Friedrich Richter, 1763-1825) is thus able to note that: “There is nothing more abundant in our time than 
aestheticians” (Jean Paul 1990: 22). 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) 
In his lectures on aesthetics in the 1820s, Hegel still seeks to keep art and philosophy in proximity with each 
other.6 Close proximity between the two is established in a joint effort to claim man’s inner subjectivity as 
the fulcrum of the world. Nonetheless, the close partnership begins to experience some tension and threaten 
to break up. The opposition between reality (or “the prose of the world” (Hegel 1817-1829/1970a: 199) and 
inner morality seems to be strengthened to such a degree that a third, neutral position, which bridges the 
gap seems untenable. Schiller and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) (Schelling 1960) had 
already given art the task of generating such a third and neutral position in reality. But even the reality, which 
has been recreated by art, is ultimately not able to reflect morality according to Hegel.  
Some level of moral consciousness can be reflected in external reality according to Hegel. This applies to 
morality at the limited level given in classical Greece. In this regard it is also possible for reality to appear as 
a complete reflection of reality in the artistic reproduction. Classical art allows the morality of the age to 
reflect pragmatically in external reality. 
At a certain point, however, man attains a level of moral consciousness which can no longer be reflected in 
external reality. Hegel’s own time is defined by the schism between external reality and man’s internalized 
morality being heightened to such a degree that morality can no longer be reproduced adequately in the 
external world. In such a situation it becomes illusory to expect of the imagination about art that it can 
concern a reproduction of reality that can mirror morality as Schiller attempts. For Hegel, the classical idea 
of art as a direct and ‘beautiful’ presentation of morality is passé. Since art in this sense no longer expresses 
the deepest interests of humanity, Hegel accordingly asserts that „art, considered in its highest highest 
vocation (Bestimmung), is and remains for us a thing of the past (ein Vergangenes)“ (belongs to the past 
(Hegel 1817-1829/1970a: 25).  
Only through own thought is Hegel strangely able to retain external reality as a mirror of the inner 
foundation. In its interpretation of reality, it is necessary for thought to add something which was not there 
                                                          
6 To Heidegger, Hegel’s philosophy of art is accordingly to be considered “the last and most magnificent aesthetics in 
the West (die letzte und grösste Ästhetik des Abendlandes)” (Heidegger 1936-40/1961a: 100). 
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to begin with. It must force its perspective on reality. Even the external presentation of art can only be 
retained as a presentation of morality by the receiver interpreting morality into the materially bounded piece 
of art. According to Hegel it is now necessary to perceive every work of art as a romantic work of art - as an 
incomplete presentation. Art can only be retained as an indirect representation of morality through thought, 
which already takes an outset in inner morality. Since the romantic work of art is able to represent modern 
secularized reality as an (imperfect) rendering of ideality, it is to be considered a higher and more ambitious 
form for art that outdistances art in its preceding classical form (Hegel 1817-1829/1970b: 128).  
Hegel is the last philosopher who was able to develop a total and substantial conception of being by taking 
and outset in the human subject and its intimate morality. He was in addition able to retain this outset in 
spite of challenges. However, hereby the human subjectivity already seems to be on the verge of 
disappearing as a basis for being and human existence. The inner and substantial subjectivity can only retain 
itself as a basis for itself through a last monumental effort and in spite of everything.  
The romantic age 
At the time when Hegel held his aesthetic lectures, however, the dissolution of substantial subjectivity had 
already been under way for a while within the third ‘neutral’ perspective. The developments being made in 
the field of art must have been instrumental in Hegel reaching the opinion that art as an external presentation 
of ideality was over. Around 1800 German Jena-romanticism sought to synthesize the opposition between 
reality and morality by completely integrating both within the third perspective of art and thus make the 
sphere of art all inclusive. 
 
FIGURE 8 
For both Kant and Schiller, reality and morality remain a fixed framework around the third perspective and 
are thereby able to dictate the boundaries of art. This thus becomes a relative autonomy. However, within 
Jena-romanticism the brothers Friedrich and August Wilhelm Schlegel (1772-1829, 1767-1845) but also 
Novalis (who’s civil name was Friedrich Hardenberg, 1772-1801) sought to integrate this framework within 
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the third perspective of art, such that the autonomy of art was no longer subject to external dictates. Art 
thus seeks to reproduce reality without this reproduction being for a certain purpose. 
This attempt fails however. The Jena-periodical Athenæum, which came out between 1798-1800, often 
contained ideas for grand and comprehensive projects, which never saw the light of day (Schlegel, 2005). 
Only small fragments of the projects were published: ruins or rubble from a building which never came into 
being. The Gesamtkunstwerk, within which the romantics wanted to integrate the contradictions of life was 
never realized and never moves beyond a fragmentary status (Lacoue-Labarthe et al. 1978). If Jena-
romanticism had been able to implement its projects and present the metaphysical surplus in full through a 
poetical Gesamtkunstwerk, art would have been able to confirm its own autonomous status as an entity that 
could grasp the absolute. Instead, it becomes clear through art that inner subjectivity cannot be expressed 
in external reality, and that reality cannot be united. Thus, through romantic art, we learn that inner 
subjectivity begins to dwindle away as a substantial basis for life. 
 
FIGURE 9 
For a while, at the beginning and in the middle of the 1800s, art mourns the loss of this unity. Later 
romanticism and French mal du siècle literature may be read as meditations on the lost subject. Early 
examples of this are found in François René de Chateaubriand’s (1768-1848) René, which came out in 1802, 
and Alfred de Musset’s (1810-1857) Confessions d’un enfant du siècle, published in 1836 (Chateaubriand 
1970; Musset 1960). 
Later in the 19th century, the value of art for art’s sake (l’art pourl’art) and the autonomy of the art work was 
increasingly asserted. In the preface to his novel Mademoiselle de Maupin Théophile Gautier (1811-1872) in 
1834 states that even as “a novel is not a pair of seamless boots,” so is “a drama” is not to be conceived as 
“a railway,” since these kinds of objects are not to be regarded as “things” that “are essentially civilizing and 
adapted to advance humanity on its path of progress”. A little further on, he stresses that, to his mind, this 
does not necessarily diminish the value of works of art, since “I am one of those to whom superfluity is a 
21 
 
necessity and I like things and persons in an inverse ratio to the services that they render me. I prefer a 
Chinese vase, strewn with dragons and mandarins, and of no use to me whatever, to a certain utensil which 
is of service to me.” In this context, Gautier even indicates that “there is nothing truly beautiful but that 
which can never be of any use whatsoever; everything useful is ugly, for it is the expression of some need, 
and man's needs are ignoble and disgusting like his own poor and infirm nature. The most useful place in a 
house is the water-closet” (Gautier 1973: 50, 54). In the same vein, Edgar Allen Poe counters the idea that a 
poem “should inculcate a moral” by stating “the simple fact” that “would we but permit ourselves to look 
into our own souls we should immediately there discover that under the sun there neither exists nor can 
exist any work more thoroughly dignified — more supremely noble than this very poem — this poem per se 
— this poem which is a poem and nothing more — this poem written solely for the poem’s sake” (Poe 1850). 
With these assertions of art for its own sake, we have come a long way since Boileau asserted that “nothing 
is beautiful but the true” and that “the true alone is agreeable”. The notion of an absolutely autonomous art 
is established, which increasingly sought its own paths without reference to any external aims. In the 
absolutely autonomous art there is an increasing reconstitution of reality, which does not rest upon any given 
basis and does not have a set goal. Rather the reconstitution of reality is taken up so as to seek non-
substantial replacements for the lost foundation and lost goals. These are temporary replacements: 
compensations that are only expected to last a while, whereupon new efforts must be made. This is the 
evident in Charles Baudelaire’s (1821-67) aesthetics of modernity that seeks to force something more than 
the momentary from modernity’s brief encounters as it finds a ‘poetic beauty’ in and thereby elevates the 
present (Baudelaire 1990b, 97-200: 195; Baudelaire 1982: 17-19; Baudelaire 1990a, 453-502: 167; Baudelaire 
1964: 13). Stéphane Mallarmés’ (1842-1898) ‘pure’ and formal graphic poetry at the end of the 19th century 
may also be seen as an instantiation of this (Mallarmé 2015). 
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FIGURE 10 
VI. The sublime experience 
The decay of being and the trans-historical 
The possibility of and tendency towards experiencing the world as lacking a foundation and direction is, 
however, already given by human subjectivity giving itself as the basis for its own existence. For Kant, it was 
necessary for nature to show itself through the representations that occur in the human subject. This 
however also opens an ambiguous fascination with a natural world that seeks to elude full recognition and 
to avoid revealing itself in its entirety. This may be seen as Immanuel Kant’s re-actualization of the Greek 
notion of nature as physis (Heidegger 1935-36/1980, 1-72: 28). 
Nevertheless, in Kant nature as ‘physis’, or as ‘that which shows itself and eludes us’, is a dynamic revelation 
of meaning. It remains reflected and refracted within the glade the modern human subject has created. 
Nature here primarily shows itself as the dark production of meaning which eludes our usual ‘human’ world 
and thereby exhibits this world’s lack of foundations. Nature is described by Kant in a number of passages as 
a strange and murky body of water with no bottom. Insofar as “it certainly seems that generally fluids are 
more ancient than solids”, the human world appears to rest upon a fleeting basis (Kant 1790/1978: 292; Kant 
1987: 223 (§ 58)). In keeping with this conception of nature, Kant in a footnote of Kritik der Urteilskraft makes 
it clear that perhaps nothing more sublime has ever been said, or a thought ever been expressed more 
sublimely, than in that inscription above the temple of Isis (Mother Nature): "I am all that is, that was, and 
that will be, and no mortal has lifted my veil" (Kant 1790/1978: 253; Kant 1987: 186). 
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 In Kant’s later work, one accordingly notices an ongoing fascination with the processes of crystallization and 
solidification. The crystal appears as an interesting and beguiling object, since it takes shape in and casts a 
flickering light in the dark submerged world. While illustrating the “transition from the fluid to the solid 
state”, crystallization also forms an emblem of the transition through which nature presents itself and takes 
shape (Kant 1790/1978: 291-92; Kant 1987: 222-23). Later on, with l’art pour l’art the autonomous work of 
art can be pictured as such a crystal, or a pearl, which takes shape in the darkness without foundation or 
direction, as it casts its enchanting lights. 
Just at the time when it comes to the fore in Kant’s philosophy how man is staging himself as a subject or as 
the basis of his own existence and being, it also stands to the fore how human life and existence on this basis 
appears unfounded. A vibrant culture is created, which undermines any attempt at establishing any 
substantial or binding nature. This sets the basis for a world where any constituted meaning or direction is 
merely preliminary, even though man is only partially attentive to this at the time.  
For a time, it was possible in the Enlightenment and in German Idealism to retain human subjectivity as a 
substantial basis for existence. Even though inner humanity is challenged as a subject for social exchange in 
general, it was still – for a while - possible to retain it as a basis for art and the aesthetic. For Kant and Schiller 
the inner subject can still assert itself quite harmoniously and meaningfully as the fulcrum of aesthetics and 
art. In this manner, aesthetics and art may come to manifest or represent what ought to be the outset for all 
societal interaction. 
 Later, from Hegel and onwards, however, it is no longer able to retain the beautiful and attractive 
appearance asserted in general by Plato and still preserved within the aesthetic field by Kant and Schiller: 
that it seems as if something higher shines thorough in such a manner that what is experienced of itself seems 
to indicate and confirm a higher being or truth. In Hegel, it is only possible to maintain and attain an outset 
and a fulcrum in inner subjectivity and a higher being both in general and within art despite or in defiance of 
the fact that they initially disagree with or express an opposition, i.e. through a violent reinterpretation or 
sublation. Finally, from the age of Romanticism and onwards, it seems no longer possible to express maintain 
and express human subjectivity as a unifying fulcrum of the world even though art continues to mourn this 
passing state for some time. 
When man turns inwards in German Idealism it may be understood as a reaction to a culture that was 
crumbling in its general foundation. Employing Nietzsche’s vocabulary, it is possible to characterize this as a 
reaction of resentment (Raffnsøe 2007: 78-83); and yet it is still a creative reaction. This was a reaction 
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against the recurring feeling of discomfort, which came about from the collapse of the classical foundation 
spurred by the formation of a new, inner basis. However, even this basis required another reaction. 
It is worth noting that this introverted reaction of resentment was successful for quite some time. Through 
this influence on the understanding of man and art, German Idealism became highly important in generating 
a normative basis for existence. However, the reference to a common internal basis can only work as long as 
there is agreement on creating and establishing this foundation in human activities – especially art and 
philosophy. Thus it is efficient so long as it convinces through its expressions. 
When agreement on that basis for mankind begins to dissolve, reference to man’s inner nature as its fulcrum 
becomes problematic. The reference is at risk of becoming empty, since there is the agreement on 
maintaining and expressing it as a reference point, or a transcendental signifier (Derrida 1967), has already 
ceased to exist. The reference ceases to function, because the language game that allowed it to express 
something has become defunct (Wittgenstein 1958). It is possible to retain the reaction of resentment, but 
the resentment loses its power and thus becomes unconvincing (Deleuze 1962).  
In retrospect, German Idealism hereby comes to appear as a movement that had its happy moments. It was 
possible, for a while, to retain a commitment to an idea about a coherent world that was built on a new basis. 
This made it possible to claim new values, which could serve as an outset for social interaction. On the other 
hand, German Idealism is slightly tragic. The claim of an inner and ultimately incontrovertible subjectivity to 
ensure interaction in society also cut off the possibility of other and perhaps better avenues. Thus the 
construction of an absolute basis turned out to be unfounded and produced a longing within the self. 
This tragedy is accentuated in the way whereby Enlightenment and German Idealism’s perceptions of 
modernity slide into and are replaced by modernism. Modernity is the latest historical epoch which sought 
to found our world and order it with the substantial and tangible metaphysics that appears in the internalized 
morality of man. By contrast, modernist literature has, since the beginning of the 1800s, been retelling the 
story about the decay of the last trans-historical order that allowed a unified world, in ever new ways. The 
longing that this decay gives rise to becomes important; and it is evident in modernist art since the 
disillusionment, melancholy and ennui of French mal du siècle literature originating in the first half of the 19th 
century; but so are the subsequent efforts to create or produce replacements for that which is lost. Thus 
there appears an awareness that the newly created is not a perfect replacement, but is only able to function 
as a preliminary and temporary thing which cannot fully stand in the place of the lost order. Modernist 
literature therefore also reflects a nihilistic experience. We become aware that the norms, which were 
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previously ascribed the highest value lose this value because they contained an inner tendency to dissolve, 
all the while we feel unable to replace them with any others of substance. 
The sublime comes to the fore as an ongoing constitutive aspect of aesthetic 
experience 
Since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, some have claimed that we have returned to ‘the sublime’ (Courtine 
1988) and that “attributed characteristics of the sublime” has been “gradually transferred to the description 
of aesthetic experience in general” (Kirwan 2005: vii). However, it can also be said that the sublime has been 
an ongoing constitutive aspect of aesthetic experience that has come to the fore since the age of 
romanticism. For romanticism, modernism and the time after, the sublime or the elevated is not one 
experience among others and not an experience that we may return to from time to time. It is the basic 
experience of modernism itself. The sublime is not only the experience that we lack the ability to conceive 
and express a substantive inner subjectivity in and of itself, but also the experience that we - in spite of this 
and in defiance of our impotence in this respect - remain able to reflect this this higher sense of being, exactly 
in and through our inaptitude and longing. Thus, the sublime is the experience that our relationship to a given 
metaphysics is no longer a matter of course, but also fraught relationship and a problematic affair insofar as 
an inner metaphysics can no longer be rendered or represented adequately. Yet the sublime is also the 
experience that even a breached promise remains a significant relationship insofar as lost metaphysics 
continues to be represented even in its absence and thus rendered imperfectly. 
The sublime begins come to the fore as a decisive or crucial kind of aesthetic experience in Kant’s Kritik der 
Urteilskraft under the title of the “Analytic of the sublime” (Kant 1790/1978: 163-91; Kant 1987: 97-125 (§ 
23-29)). In the sublime aesthetic experience, the observer comes into contact with own limitations and 
therefore displeasure, since these are experiences of things that cannot immediately be contained in the self. 
However, Kant is invigorated since he is thereby forced to transcend himself. When a person for instance 
enters St. Peter’s Basilica in Rome or contemplates the Egyptian Pyramids up close, this person becomes 
aware that the mind cannot contain what it sees and is pained by that. However, this also results in the 
rupturing of our cognitive abilities, whereby we become able to form an idea of the eternal. Because of this 
transgression of limits and expansion of self we feel pleasure in this “mathematically sublime” (Kant 
1790/1978: 169-84; Kant 1987: 103-118 (§ 25-27)). When a person observes erupting volcanoes or an endless 
ocean in motion it becomes possible, according to Kant, to perceive the “dynamically sublime” (Kant 
1790/1978: 184-91; Kant 1987: 119-26 (§ 28-29)). Perception shows an object, the exertion of which is so 
violent that it could destroy the person. Hereby the object reveals the physical impotence and existential 
exposure, whereby displeasure is experienced. Nonetheless, in this experience, the perceiver is still able to 
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come to terms with the situation, whereby pleasure appears in such a way that man is shown to be above 
mere nature. This pleasure indicates something higher that man strives for and wants without being able to 
explain or contain it as such. For this reason, the encounter results in pleasure and displeasure at one and 
the same time. 
However, for Kant, the sublime experience is still an exception, and an experience that seems to be examined 
and discussed in passing. In the aesthetic experience as it is articulated in Kritik der Urteilskraft, the world in 
general (re)appears as beautiful again. In connection with aesthetic experience, it may at times seem, once 
again, as if the world is inherently and unforcedly coherent, as appears to order itself around and point in 
the direction of a certain kind of higher and better being. For Hegel, romantic thinkers and poets, and then 
subsequent modernist literature, however, the world is at best experienced as sublime or elevated and 
eminent every now and then. Although the world is in general incoherent and disparate, certain aesthetic 
experiences, when willfully and forcefully re-interpreted may strangely and in spite of everything elevate us 
above this state and above our limitations, such that the world despite its immediate appearances still seems 
to point beyond itself and refer to a higher being. However, this being remains elevated and is no longer 
exhibited directly, completely and substantially in our world. It is only experienced and rendered indirectly 
and incompletely. It thus remains something above and beyond the world as we usually know it. It therefore 
appears as partially absent and incomprehensible, as something that is imminent, outstanding and beyond 
full mediation, just as Jahve in the Old Testament once appeared as elevated above the world only to 
manifest himself incompletely via sudden interventions into the world that left certain, not fully 
comprehensible traces in the history of the Israelites.7 
Insofar as the sublime being leaves a trace in this world without appearing fully in, it is technically speaking 
never fully present or presented as a substantial being. Rather, it appears as something that exerts a powerful 
influence and brings about an effect, without appearing in itself, which entails that we are unable to conceive 
and retain it. All we can do is to approach it and allow it to appear again and again in ever new ways within 
                                                          
7 In Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik, Hegel points out how the sublime has a religious and metaphysical origin. In extension 
of this, he views Kant’s outset in the subjective perspective and its properties as an immediate reduction of the concept 
of the sublime. At the same time, he agrees with Kant that the elevated being is not given in the objects of nature as 
such, but only in relationship to nature in us and through this in relationship to external nature. However, this only 
happens “in our minds (in unserem Gemüte)” insofar as “we become conscious of our superiority to the nature within 
us and therefore to nature without” (Hegel 1817-1829/1970a: 467). In this context, Hegel defines the sublime as: “the 
attempt to express the infinite (das Unendliche auszudrücken), without finding in the sphere of phenomena (in dem 
Bereich der Erscheinungen) an object which proves adequate for this representation (welcher sich für diese Darstellung 
passend erwiese)” (Hegel 1817-1829/1970a: 467). 
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the aesthetic experience. Within the aesthetic realm, the sublime can be carried into effect and articulated 
in an infinite repetitive motion and remediation. 
V. The changed aesthetic experience of the contemporary age 
The aesthetic declaration of independence: Liberation and desubstantialization  
In this article the ongoing transformation of aesthetic experience has been described by following and 
articulating the principal stages in a historical development of aesthetical experience that has been pushing 
the agenda at least in Western societies. The changes and innovations appear relatively early in certain places 
and environments to subsequently spread. As has been stated, crucial first-hand experience is gained 
relatively early on and in a sharpened, accentuated, and rigorous form in certain highly intellectual modernist 
circles; especially in nations such as Germany and France in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Over time, these 
experiences have left their esoteric taste behind to become collective property shared in an exoteric form 
(Lyotard 1986; Lyotard 1992).  
As a consequence, the described experiences and transformations might even be said to be indicative and 
agenda-setting to the extent that they appear as exemplary. Subsequently, they have been disseminated as 
common knowledge. They have spread to the general public and become prevalent. Generalized and 
naturalized – yet not necessarily prominent, conspicuous or conscious. The results of these transitions work 
as preconditions and expectations that we all carry with us and that thus determine how we perceive, 
understand and relate not only to works of art, but also to aesthetic experience and effects in general. 
In general, the outcome of the described development is an ongoing liberation of the aesthetic, whether in 
the form of aesthetic perception and affects, aesthetic objects, aesthetic experiences or artistic effects. 
During the course of this history, the aesthetic plane of existence has thus radically changed status and role. 
Whether in the form of art, artistic effects or artistic perception, the aesthetic no longer appears as 
subordinate and servile (Rancière 2009: 28-29). Rather it has been set free from its previous state of 
subordination, devoting it to the task of mirroring, representing, or mimicking something more basic and 
antecedent, whether this be a more foundational level of being, ‘the good’, or ‘truth’. Borrowing phrases 
from the American Declaration of Independence, one could say that, in modernity, the aesthetic has dissolved 
the traditional political bonds which have traditionally connected it to and subjected it to other spheres to 
“assume among the powers of the earth a separate and equal station”. 
 As a consequence of its declaration of independence, the aesthetic has begun to step forth as an 
independent plane of existence in its own right, which at first glance appears irreducible and unconnected. 
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As it has also previously been suggested, this experience accordingly leads to the desubstantialization of the 
aesthetic. Since aesthetic objects, effects or aesthetic perception are no longer on the face of it coupled to a 
foundation, which is to be represented and which it falls back upon, means that they appear as more fleeting 
and transitory. 
The fictionality of the aesthetic: reconfiguration and revivification 
Nevertheless, this liberation does not lead into to a state of complete and unrestrained freedom in which all 
ties to the surrounding reality are severed. The emancipation of the aesthetic does not mean that the 
aesthetic becomes a realm apart, merely superfluous or irrelevant to the rest of the world, or even a non-
commital pastime or diversion. In this sense, the transition can also be described as the differentiation and 
isolation of a new sphere that differs from its surroundings in that what transpires here must live up to and 
satisfy a new set of standards or criteria (Luhmann 1995: 42; Luhmann 1997: 978-80). The aesthetic sphere 
is related to its surroundings precisely in force of the way in which these criteria differ from and is connected 
to its surroundings. 
Contrary to what intuition or common sense would indicate, one could thus claim that precisely aesthetics’ 
emancipation from its function as a representative, mediator, disseminator or communicator of something 
more foundational, is what makes the aesthetic pretense or aesthetic appearances seem even more essential 
and indispensable. 
In keeping with the idea of aesthetic autonomy, at first suggested in German idealism by especially Kant and 
Schiller, aesthetic experience has become autonomized in an increasingly marked way. Aesthetic experience 
has been set free as a specific sphere of experience which shakes and “invalidates the ordinary hierarchies 
incorporated in everyday sensory experience” (Rancière 2005, 13: 15) as soon as one enters this relocatable 
sphere or globe (Rancière 2012); and in prolongation hereof the aesthetic stands out as a specific 
transferrable sphere devoted to making this kind of experience in a particularly marked way.  
With the accentuation and dissemination of aesthetic experience, esthetic radiance or glare (Schein), which 
previously brought forth something mores basic or a higher level of being, has acquired a different status and 
function. Aesthetic rendering or radiance now appears as a comprehensive and incontrovertible medium, 
which it is impossible to get behind or raise oneself above. As a consequence, the aesthetic surface has now 
become even more essential in appearing as a medium that we remain in and which we must come to terms 
with. The fact that the aesthetical suspension has become disseminated and democratized has resulted in a 
more free and uncensored use of the aesthetical effects. But this transformation has likewise resulted in our 
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relationship to these effects becoming more precarious, because the aesthetical appears as an ungovernable 
and all-inclusive medium in which our very existence as human beings is at stake. 
In extension of the described development, the aesthetic no longer appears as a means of representation, 
but as fiction. Through aesthetic effects and in the aesthetic experience, we project something new, which 
was not there before and which reaches beyond reality as we have known it hitherto as it appears or shines 
forth. With the aesthetic, something appears which was not there before and is added to or grafted onto 
what was already actually there, but in in such a manner that something not previously existing is introduced 
or imagined (Blanchot 1959) that does not necessarily fit into the pre-established bounds of sense or 
experience (Nancy 1976: 116), but “exceeds the present time” (Barthes 1979: 8). In the fictive universe of 
the aesthetic, the previous basis of being is thus transformed and fundamentally reconstituted, albeit 
hypothetically, in an anticipating or forestalling manner (Foucault 1968b, 7-8; Foucault 1968a, 13-26). The 
aesthetic is thus of fundamental importance, not because it presents a new foundation, but since it changes 
our previous outset and mindset in essential ways. 
In extension of the described transition, the aesthetic Schein thus appears as a plane upon which life is 
revivified and surpasses itself in its hitherto established shape. Accordingly, the aesthetic puts the 
transcendental movement on centre stage; because within this aesthetic surface it becomes possible to 
transcend or surpass ourselves.  
Hereby aesthetics comes to concern our being and our fundamental attitude. In this effort there occurs an 
ongoing and open movement – not only about who we are, but also, and perhaps more importantly, who we 
can and could be. Aesthetics concerns and involves identity, self-comprehension and authenticity, but also 
and in particular in the form of self-revelation and self-transformation. 
The relative autonomy of the aesthetic experience 
With the generalization and the ubiquity of aesthetics, it has also become increasingly manifest that this self-
revelation or self-transformation is not simply relegated to the confines of a particular aesthetic sphere. 
Neither can the fictionality or transformativity of the aesthetic simply be conceived as a (limited) end in itself. 
As has become increasingly conspicuous with time and with the propagation of aesthetics, the aesthetic field 
was from the outset, as is evident in Kant and Schiller, set free as a specific sphere of experience, but with 
the ulterior motive of anticipating, articulating, and rendering an alternative general form of sensory 
experience intelligible. On closer inspection, thus, the autonomy of the aesthetic was from the outset never 
absolute, but relative (Raffnsøe 1998; Raffnsøe & Pethick 2016). Aesthetic experience and aesthetic objects 
were meant to point beyond themselves as they anticipated a different manner of perceiving, a different 
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truth and/or a different manner of being, affecting not only for individual existence but also indicating new 
modes of existence for collective life in general. As Rancière sums up in retrospect: “Precisely because it was 
a place where the usual hierarchies which framed everyday life was withdrawn,” “aesthetic experience was 
taken as the principle of a new form of collective life” (Rancière 2005 13: 21). Yet, it is also a new and reversed 
form of collective life that may never be fully realized or come to be and that has seemed to constantly recede 
into the future throughout the history discussed here. 
On closer inspection, then, it is simultaneously evident from the very beginning of aesthetic autonomy that 
the aesthetic sphere does not gain its relative independence, just to be later simply and outright sublated. At 
the end of the day, aesthetic autonomy is never fully revoked and dissolved into in the alternative state of 
being that it indicates and incites us to move towards.  
As already Kant expresses it, a specific aesthetic sensation and the way it is experienced occasions a general 
verdict or judgement of taste concerning the object experienced, e.g. that a given rose is beautiful; and 
accordingly the verdict presupposes that we should all gather in agreement concerning this. Unlike a logically 
universal judgment, however, the judgment does not “postulate everyone’s agreement;” instead, it “merely 
suggests (or aspires) that everyone should join in or attune (es sinnet nur jedermann diese Einstimmung an),” 
and it “expects confirmation (Bestätigung) not from concepts from the adhesion or approval (Beitritt) of 
others” (Kant 1790/1978: 130; Kant 1987: 60 (§ 8)). What brings us joy, after all, in the aesthetic judgment is 
not a given and existing general agreement or concord, but instead “its subjective condition”: “die allgemeine 
Mitteilungsfähigkeit des Gemütszustandes,” or the common ability to participate in a state of mind that does 
not yet exist as a given and share it with and communicate it to others (Kant 1790/1978: 131; Kant 1987: 61 
(§ 9)). Accordingly, Kant also later states that the “judgement of taste” “suggests (or aspires) that everyone 
should back it up or chime in (sinnet jedermann Beistimmung an).” “Hence the Should in an aesthetic 
judgement (…) is still uttered only conditionally. One solicits (werben um) everybody’s joining in 
(Beistimmung) (Kant 1790/1978: 156; Kant 1987: 86 (§ 19)). The aesthetic sensibility and experience does 
not permit to grasp an “objective rationality” (Kant 1790/1978: 295; Kant 1987: 225), but indicates an 
evaluation and a mode of existence that we should share, but does not necessarily share. In this manner, 
aesthetic experience works as an “indirect” or “symbolic” rendering (Darstellung), permitting to anticipate 
an alternative (social) reality that we should partake in, but that we can only point towards in the aesthetic 
and that we may never be able to fully attain and represent in an unmediated form.  
This being so, the aesthetic acquires the status of an intermediate state that is essentially anticipatory in 
character, turned towards the future, and full of expectation and promise. Moreover, since the promise can 
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only be honoured at the expense of the suspension of aesthetic suspense, the aesthetic takes the form of a 
persistent and continuous in-between, if a state incessantly kept in suspension. 
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